Resource title

A model of strategic delegation in contests between groups

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Resource description

We analyze a contest between two groups where group members have differing valuations for the contested rent. Generically the pivotal group member with the median valuation of the rent will not act himself but will want to send a group member that has preferences different to her own into the contest. The delegation can be either to more or less 'radical' group members. The direction of delegation depends on the order of moves and the relative 'aggressiveness' of the group medians. We show that almost certainly very asymmetric equilibria arise, even if the median group members value the rent (almost) equally. Delegation can lead to a social improvement in terms of resources spent in the contest.

Resource author

Stefan Brandauer, Florian Englmaier

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Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19118

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.