Resource title

Centralized vs. de-centralized multinationals and taxes

Resource image

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Resource description

The paper examines how country tax differences affect a multinational enterprise?s choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs - here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument -, we show that (de-)centralized decisions are more profitable when tax differentials are (small) large.

Resource author

Søren Bo Nielsen, Pascalis Raimondos-Møller, Guttorm Schjelderup

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19050

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.