Resource title

The market for protection and the origin of the state

Resource image

image for OpenScout resource :: The market for protection and the origin of the state

Resource description

We examine a stark setting in which security or protection can be provided by self-governing groups or by for-profit entrepreneurs (kings, kleptocrats, or mafia dons). Though selfgovernance is best for the population, it faces problems of long-term viability. Typically, in providing security the equilibrium market structure involves competing lords, a condition that leads to a tragedy of coercion: all the savings from the provision of collective protection are dissipated and welfare can be as low as, or even lower than, in the absence of the state.

Resource author

Kai A. Konrad, Stergios Skaperdas

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19042

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.