Resource title

Succession rules and leadership rents

Resource image

image for OpenScout resource :: Succession rules and leadership rents

Resource description

Leaders compensate supporters not just for performing their duties but also in order to preempt an overthrow by the same supporters. We show how succession rules affect the power of leaders relative to supporters as well as the resources expended on possible succession struggles. We compare two regimes of leadership succession: the conclave regime and the divide-et-impera regime which differ with respect to the role of supporters of the previous leader once the new leader takes power. The leadership rent is higher and supporters receive a lower compensation in the divide-et-impera regime, as supporters have to fight harder for succession to avoid the grim outcome of loss. A leader, then, would like to induce the divide-et-impera regime even when every supporter has veto power over his leadership.

Resource author

Kai A. Konrad, Stergios Skaperdas

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18998

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.