Resource title

Optimal redistributive taxation when government's and agents' preferences differ

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Resource description

Paternalism, merit goods and specific egalitarianism are concepts we sometimes meet in the literature. The thing in common is that the policy maker does not fully respect the consumer sovereignty principle and designs policies according to some other criterion than individuals? preferences. Using the self-selection approach to tax problems developed by Stiglitz (1982) and Stern (1982), the paper provides a characterization of the properties of an optimal redistributive mixed tax scheme in the general case when the government evaluates individuals? well-being using a different utility function than the one maximized by private agents.

Resource author

Sören Blomquist, Luca Micheletto

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Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18793

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.