Resource title

Mobile Phone Termination Charges with Asymmetric Regulation

Resource image

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Resource description

We model competition between two unregulated mobile phone companies with price-elastic demand and less than full market coverage. We also assume that there is a regulated full-coverage fixed network. In order to induce stronger competition, mobile companies could have an incentive to raise their reciprocal mobile{to{mobile access charges above the marginal costs of termination. Stronger competition leads to an increase of the mobiles' market shares, with the advantage that (genuine) network effects are strengthened. Therefore, `collusion' may well be in line with social welfare.

Resource author

Pio Baake, Kay Mitusch

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18351

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.