Resource title

Corporate Self-Regulation vs. Ex-Ante Regulation of Network Access: A Model of the German Gas Sector

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Resource description

This paper compares the outcomes of corporate self-regulation and traditional ex-ante regulation of network access to monopolistic bottlenecks. In the model of self-regulation, the domestic gas supplier and network owner and the monopsonistic gas customer fix quantities and the network access price, whereas the competitive fringe of foreign gas producers (third party) and the household customers are excluded from the agreement. The results are then compared with the outcome of traditional ex-ante regulation. We find that while industrial self-regulation leads to an exploitation of households, the effect on the foreign producers is unclear.

Resource author

Georg Meran, Christian R. von Hirschhausen

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Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18289

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.