Resource title

Tax Competition and the Choice of Tax Structure in a Majority Voting Model

Resource image

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Resource description

This note studies the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model with tax competition. Regions may tax mobile capital or immobile labor. Individuals differ with respect to their relative endowments of labor and capital. Even though a lump sum tax is available, the equilibrium capital tax in a jurisdiction may be positive. In a symmetric equilibrium, this will be true if the median capital endowment is smaller than average.

Resource author

Rainald Borck

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18071

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.