Resource title

Lobbying Bureaucrats - Delegation and Influence Under Alternative Political Structures

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Resource description

This paper studies how interest group lobbying of the bureaucracy affects policyoutcomes and how it changes the legislature’s willingness to delegate decision-makingauthority to the bureaucracy. We extend the standard model of delegation to accountfor interest group influence during the implementation stage of policy and apply itto different institutional structures of government. The paper addresses the followingquestions: First, how does the decision to delegate change when the bureaucratic agentis subject to external influence? What cost does this influence impose on the legislativeprincipal? Finally, how susceptible are policy choices to bureaucratic lobbying underdifferent government structures? In answering these questions, the paper seeks to providea comparative theory of lobbying and to explain the different patterns of interestgroup activity across political systems.

Resource author

Morten Bennedsen, Sven E. Feldmann

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Resource language

eng

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application/pdf

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7561

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