Resource title

The Investment Effects of Price Caps under Imperfect Competition. A Note.

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Resource description

This note analyzes a simple Cournot model where firms choose outputs and capacities facing varying demand and price-cap regulation. We find that binding price caps set above long-run marginal cost increase (rather than decrease) aggregate capacity investment. (author's abstract) ; Series: Working Papers / Research Institute for Regulatory Economics

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Stefan Buehler, Anton Burger, Robert Ferstl

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Resource publish date

Resource language

en

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application/pdf

Resource resource URL

http://epub.wu.ac.at/1766/1/document.pdf

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