Resource title

Efficiency and federalism in the European Union. The optimal assignment of policy tasks to different levels of government.

Resource image

image for OpenScout resource :: Efficiency and federalism in the European Union. The optimal assignment of policy tasks to different levels of government.

Resource description

This paper surveys the theoretical and empirical research on the efficient assignment of policy tasks to different levels of government and applies the results on the delimitation of competences within the European Union. The main results are: (i) A precise derivation of an optimal degree of decentralisation is not possible because of mixed theoretical suggestions. The adequate degree of decentralisation has to be detected case-by-case. (ii) Systematic evidence on direct relationships between economic performance and fiscal decentralisation is ambiguous and scarce. (iii) Comparing the de facto delimitation of EU-competences with the normative recommendations, remarkable discrepancies arise in the fields of agriculture and defence. (iv) The establishment of a flexible assignment-scheme by the European Convention is an undeniable necessity in order to guarantee reversibility and to cope efficiently with changing general conditions. (author's abstract) ; Series: EI Working Papers / Europainstitut

Resource author

Fritz Breuss, Markus Eller

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

en

Resource content type

application/pdf

Resource resource URL

http://epub.wu.ac.at/1752/1/document.pdf

Resource license

Adapt according to the license agreement. Always reference the original source and author.