Resource title

Licensing and the battle between standards

Resource image

image for OpenScout resource :: Licensing and the battle between standards

Resource description

This paper considers the competition between reval incompatible systems composed of hardware and complementary software, and models a strategy commonly used by developers of hardware standards, the licensing of technology to third-party firms. Licensing acts as a commitment to lower hardware prices, which increases the willingness of software developers to sink money into development of software for the licensed technology. The resulting increased software availability in turn increases hardware adoption. Results show that licensing is profitable when software development costs are relatively low and when only one firm licenses. Hence there exists a coordination game, the result of which is a mixed-strategy licensing equilibrium, where consumer surplus and total welfare increases, while total profits fall

Resource author

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language


Resource content type


Resource resource URL

Resource license

Copyright INSEAD. All rights reserved